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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
P . \ FL HILL, by and through his 
guardian ad litem, JAMES L. HILL, 
Plalmtiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
Hl·~X CLO\\rARD and RUBIN Mc-
DOUGAL, djbja The Frostop, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT''S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9687 
STATE~IENT OF ·THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for personal 
injury. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
. .:-\ jury in the Third Judicial District Court brought 
in a verdict of no cause of action, based upon a special 
verdict in the court of the Honorable A. H. Ellet. A 
motion for a new trial was denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a new trial. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Paul Hill, an eleven year old minor, 
was injured on August 8, 1961, when he fell from an ice 
cream truck being driven by one of the defendants, Rex 
Cloward, a seventeen year old minor, the plaintiff re-
ceiving among other injuries, a broken clavicle. The 
defendant Rex Cloward was acting as the agent and em-
ployee of the other defendant, Rubin McDougal, who 
owned the business and the truck. (R. 60 ~14) The ice 
cream truck that was being driven by the defendant Rex 
Cloward was a three quarter ton truck with large mirrors 
on both sides, and played simple tunes to attract children 
and to induce them to purchase ice cream. (R. 17, 18) The 
truck had a foot long running board not Inore than twen-
ty inches from the drivers position in the front of the 
truc:k. (R. 80) On that date, the plaintiff and another boy 
were in front of the plaintiff's house at 4309 \Yest 5500 
South, J(earns, Utah. The defendant Rex Cloward drove 
up in front of the house with the truck, playing the said 
tunes. The two boys approached the truck and asked for 
free crushed ice cream cones. At this point the facts are 
in dispute. It was the plaintiff's contention that the plain-
tiff Paul Hill was standing on the running board of the. 
true:k when the defendant Rex Cloward, being irritated 
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b~· the boy's request for free cones or as a matter of 
adolescent impulsiveness, suddenly took off and stopped 
briefly at a stop sign at 4420 West 5500 South; that 
plaintiff Paul Hill asked Cloward to let him off or he 
would tell his father but that Cloward accelerated the 
car, and the boy fell off the truck (R. 55). It was the 
defendant's contention that the plaintiff had actually 
gotten onto the back of the truck out of the vision of the 
driver; that the driver was only aware of his presence 
through the plaintiff's statements to him from the back 
of the truck; that the driver Rex Cloward stopped at the 
stop sign to let him ·off; that he thought the plaintiff had 
gotten off the truck and was unaware of his fall from 
the truck until later on in the day (R. 75, et seq.). 
The court then submitted a special verdict to the 
jury and on the basis of their answers to the special 
verdict, directed a no cause of action judgment against 
the plaintiff. (R. 100) The plaintiff then moved for a 
new trial which was denied (R. 109), from which the 
plaintiff now appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S REMARKS CONCERNING HIS 
LACK OF INSURANCE CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR. 
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During the interrogation by the Court of defendant 
Rubin McDougal, the owner of the business and truck 
in question, made' the following statements (R. 15, 16) : 
"Court: Why don't you bring the truck up 
and let us look at it~ Can it be brought up~ 
A. I haven't any insurance or license on it. 
I have the truck, yes. 
·Court : We can take care of your license, 
bring it up and le·t us look at it, will it run~ 
A. Certainly it will run. I have no insurance 
on it at the· present time. 
Mr. Strong: vVill you bring it up~ 
A. Surely, if someone wants to put the in-
surance on it and take the responsibility." 
·The remainder of that portion of the interrogation 
concerns the immunity of J\1:cDougal from arrest for 
driving the truck to the courthouse without a license on 
it. 
It should be clearly apparent from this portion of 
the record and the testimony of the witness that it "·as 
the intention of the defendant :McDougal to convey the 
impression to the jury that his car was not insured at the 
time of the accident. It is common knowledge in the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
State of Utah that in the event of a motor vehicle acci-
d('nt, if the owner is not insured, he either has to post a 
bond or his license plates are taken away from him. 
Also, the accident occurred on August 8, 1961, at which 
ti1ne the defendant had license plates. The trial was held 
on February 19, 1962, at which time the defendant's 
license plates should have still been in good standing. 
There can be no other interpretation that can be derived 
from this statement of the defendant. It should also be 
noted that this testimony was brought out upon interro-
gation by the Court. It had no purpose to be mentioned 
except for the reason we have previously alluded to. 
There are· three factors involved here : 
1. T'his statement was not elicited by either coun-
sel, but by t'he eourt. 
2. It was a voluntary declaration by the defen-
dant having little, if any, referenre to the 
question of the court. 
3. It was a statement made regarding the lack 
of insurance by the defendant himself. 
The cases on the issue of where insuranee is men-
tioned in a personal injury case involving motor vehicles 
are multitudinous and many and have been subject to 
review by many courts. It is apparent from a survey of 
the cases that the whole subject of mentioning insurance 
in a negligenre ra~e is surrounded with taboo. shibboleth, 
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and ceremony, which was designed primarily to protect 
the defendant from excessive verdicts in favor of the 
plaintiff. See Trial and Tort Trends Through 1954, Pre-
Convention Semina-r, Mternoon Session, August 29, 1954, 
"The Forbidden Word'', By Payne H. Ratner, Wichita, 
Kansas, p. 138. 
In the case at hand, however, involves the opposite 
of the issue, and that is where the defendant himself 
states that he has no insurance. This too is designed and 
calculated to sway and influence the mind of the jury in 
the opposite direction. The end result of such statements 
would result in an insufficient verdict for the plaintiff, 
or, as in the instant case, a verdict of no cause of action 
against the plaintiff. 
In the general annotation in A. L. R. on the subjec-
tion, 4 A. L. R. 2d 761, ''Admissibility of evidence and 
propriety and effect of questions, statements, comments, 
etc., tending to show that defendant in personal injury or 
death action carries liability insurance", at P. 773, Sec-
tion 4: "Evidence that defendant is not insured, or only 
partly insured.'' 
'' vVhere nothing has been done or said from 
which the jury nught infer that the defendant 
is protected by liability insurance it is improper 
for defendant to show that he does not have in-
surance protection, Socony Y acuum Oil Co. v. 
:Marvin (1946) 313 J\fich. 528, 21 N\Y 2d 841; 
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Brown v. :Murphy Transfer & Storage Co. (1933) 
190 ~[inn 81, 251 NW 5; Clayton v. Wells (1930) 
3241\Io 1176, 26 SW 2d 969; Piechuck v. Magusiak 
(19~6) 82 NH 429, 135 A 534; Davis v. Underdahl 
( 1932) 1-t:O Or 2-12, 13 P2d 362 : Cosgrove v. Tracey 
( 1937) 156 Or 1, 64 P2d 1321. 
"Indeed in at least one case it has been held 
proper to exclude evidence that defendant is not 
insured although there is already in the case evi-
dence from which it may be inferred that he is 
insured", citing Avent v. Tucker (1940) 188 Miss 
207, 194 So 596. 
The latest pronouncement that we could find on the 
subject con1es frmn Graham v. Wriston, Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia, (1961), 120 S. E. 2d 713, at 
P. 713, quoting from the syllabus: 
"9 . . New Trial Closing argument that jurors 
were in position of having a blank check with de-
fendant's name signed on it, implied that defen-
dant was not insured and especially since counsel 
making such argument knew that defendant was 
in fact insured, it was not an abuse of discretion 
to set aside verdict for defendant and grant new 
trial because of such argument; notwithstanding 
fact that state trooper had testified at trial he 
had made pictures available to insurance company 
and defendant's counsel had such pictures.'' 
and at p. 720, the Court quotes from Haid v. Loder-
stedt, -15 vl.J. Super. 5-t-7, 133 A. 2d 655, 657, as follows: 
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'' 'It seems to us that the prejudice- suffered 
ordinarily by a plaintiff through the improper 
revelation of absence of insurance coverage by 
the defendant is likely to be even greater than 
when the disclosure of such protection of the de-
fendant is injected by the plaintiff. Certainly it 
cannot be said to he less hurtful. But more than 
this, the act of conveying t'he information to the 
jury by a defendant is more deserving of condem-
nation when the action knows that the implied fact 
is untrue. And so the- inclination of a court to find 
prejudicial error in such a situation is more 
readily stimulated.' 
'It is true that the plaintiffs did not ask for 
a mistrial when the objection to counsel's remark 
was sustained. Nor did the trial judge instruct 
the jury to disregard the statement. However, we 
think the transgression of the ordinary rules of 
fair play was so flagrant that on the basis of plain 
error another day in court should be given to the 
probable victims of their adversary's disingen-
uousness.''' 
It would appear that if the courts have chosen to 
build a 'high wall of taboo around the mention of the 
word ''insurance" by the plaintiff, in view of the general 
knowledge of juries that the defendant is usually in-
sured (See The Forbidden Word, Ratner, supra, at P. 
141: General Knowledge of Insurance), it would seem 
more appropriate to build even a higher wall of taboo 
around the mention of the forbidden word by the defen-
dant. 
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POINT II 
THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN GIVING AN 
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION DETRIMENTAL TO PLAIN-
TIFF AFTER ARGUMENT BY COUNSEL CONSTITUTED 
REVERSIBLE PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In the present case, after instructions had been given 
and the case being fully argued to the jury, the trial court 
proceeded as follows: (R. 90) 
"THE COPRT: Gentlemen, I am going to give 
you one more instruction. I am going to insert it. 
It will be - let's see. It will be No. 14-A. and 
will read thus :'' 
"No. 14-A. No person shall ride, and no person 
driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly permit 
any person to ride, upon any portion of any 
vehicle not designed nor intended for the use of 
passengers. In this case it is undisputed that the 
plaintiff was riding on the vehicle at -a place 
neither designed nor intended for the use of 
passengers. If, therefore, you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, con-
sidering his age, intelligence and experience, knew 
or in the exercise of due care should have known 
that it was dangerous to ride or attempt to ride 
on the vehicle in the manner in which he was 
attempting to do, then and in that event, you are 
instn1eted that the plaintiff was negligent." 
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Plaintiff took a proper exception to this instruction 
(R. 96). 
It would appear that the giving of this instruction 
after seemingly all of the instructions were given, and 
after argument to the jury by counsel, would not only 
deprive plaintiff's counsel from the right to review the 
instructions \Vith the trial court and other counsel, but 
hy giving special emphasis to this instruction, would 
amount to in effect a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant. In 3 Am Jttr 639, Appeal and Error, Section 
1121, Time of Giving, it is stated : 
"It is not per se prejudicial error that instruc-
tions are given to the jury after the argument, in 
disregard of the statute, but if injury results by 
giving an instruction at the wrong time, it is re-
versible error.'' 
"One must show injury in order to secure a re-
versal for a breach of a rule of court requiring 
instructions to be settled between the court and 
~ounsel before argument to the jury begins.", cit-
ing 2 ALR 1-Hl~. Shelrlon. r. Jnmes 175 Cal. 474, 
166. P. ~-
That the errors we have listed under the two points 
that "re urge for reasons for reversal did indeed pre-
judire the jury is apparent from an examination of the 
rerord. It should be recalled that it was the plaintiff's 
C'ontention that after the plaintiff mounted the runninp: 
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board of the truck, he· was in fact practically the' captive 
of an adolescent driver. Question No. One of the Special 
YPrdict reads as follows (R. 103) : 
·'Question 1 : After leaving the stop sign, did Rex 
Cloward know or in the exercise of re'asonable care 
should have :known that Paul Hill was still on the truck'? 
Answer No." In response to questions by his own coun-
sel, the defendant Paul Hill states as follows (R. 84) 
sel, the defendant Rex Cloward states as follows (R 84) 
"Q. Now, as you started up, did you think 
he was on the truck~ 
A. No. I thought he would have sense 
enough to get off. 
Q. Well, did you think he had got off~ 
A. I ttcasn't sure." (emphasis ours) 
Then on R. 85, line 22, during the' same period of 
questioning, the testimony proceeds as follows : 
''Q. What is the next thing that you heard 
or saw~ 
A. X ext thing I heard was he yelled." (em-
phasis ours) 
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At whioh point counsel for defendant attempts to 
correct this by a leading question. 
"Q. You heard a yell? 
A. Yes." 
See also page 86 of the Record, wherein the defen-
dant Rex Cloward testifies that he saw a boy lying in the 
middle of the road, but made not attempt to stop or 
investigate·. 'The fact that he did not go back to give aid 
is indicative of guilt as to the wilfulness of his conduct, 
and his knowledge of the fact that the boy was still on 
the truck. 
Finally, the prejudicial attitude of the jury is indi-
cated by the answer to Que'Stion No. Five of the Special 
\'" erdirt. whieh reads as follows (R. 105): 
"Question 5 : As shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence in this case, what amount of money would fair-
ly and adequately recompense Paul Hill for any and all 
damage and injury lw sustained as a result of his fall 
from t'hP ice crPam truck~ Answer $100.00" 
Yet the medical testimony indicates that the boy 
suffered a broken clavicle and that the special damages 
themselves WPTP $R2.50. whi(>h ·wonld }pave dan1ag-es for 
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pain and suffering assessed in the amount of $17.50. Can 
it be denied that the two facts mentioned had indeed pre-
judiced the minds of the jury~ 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, we submit that it is one of the primary 
functions of an appellate court in negligence cases to 
ascertain if each of the litigants has been given a fair 
trial and has had indeed "his day in court". We further 
submit that because of the prejudicial nature of the two 
errors we have raised on appeal, the plaintiff has not 
had his day in court. It is of particular importance that 
the fact of the lack of insurance coverage by the defen-
dant be invested with the same, if not greater, protection 
than the disclosure of he fact that the defendant is in-
sured. We therefore respectfully request that the judg-
ment be reversed that the plaintiff be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN E. STONE 
MARK S. MINER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
816 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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